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STUDENT NOTES
EQUITY - FIDUCIARY OR CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS - WHiAT
CONSTITwES. - The existence of a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tion between the parties at the time of entering into a contract
is a matter of much importance. If there is such a relationship,
the utmost good faith aid frankness must characterize all trans.
actions between the parties.' There is not much dispute as to the
effects of a confidential relation, but its existence is not always
easy to establish. Story says:
"Though of strictly differing signification, the phrases
'fiduciary relations' and 'confidential relations' are ordinarily
used as convertible terms and have reference to any rela-
tionship of blood, business, friendship, or association in
which the parties repose special trust and confidence in each
other and are in a position to have and exercise, or do have
and exercise, influence over each other."
1Hinkle v. Hinkle, 34 W. Va. 142, 11 S. E. 993 (1890) ; Planters' Bank v.
Hornberger, 44 Tenn. 443, 4 Coldw. 530 (1867).
2STORY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, (14th ed. 1918) § 370.
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Any attempted definition is necessarily general, for the idea
of such a relationship is one that cannot be hedged in by hard
and fast lines. There are, however, some relations, or situations,
which are regularly recognized as involving a high degreq of con-
fidence and trust. A few classical examples are agent and prin-
cipal,' trustee and cestui,' attorney and client,' guardian and
ward,' fiance and fiancee: The significant factor is that one of
the parties has justifiably come to repose confidence and trust in
the other; and, for that reason, they can no longer deal at arm's
length like strangers.'
In general, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has shown a tendency to uphold a rather high standard of good
faith by those who owe a fiduciary responsibility.' Two recent
cases, however, well illustrate the difficulties that may arise in
connection with applying the confidential relations idea to
particular fact situations.
In the case of Williamson v. First National Bank of
Williamson," a widow was seeking to have an antenuptial con-
tract set aside on the ground that its full import was not made
known to her before she signed it. By it she received twenty-
one thousand dollars and gave up her dower rights in an estate
of approximately a million and a half dollars. The court con-
ceded that the contract would have been void for want of dis-
closures by the husband at the time it was made if a confidential
relation had existed between the parties at that time. The
pertinent facts were that in 1884, Mr. Williamson, a widower
with four children, fell in love with the plaintiff, Ellen Blair,
an illiterate girl of fifteen, and introduced her to his friends as
his intended wife. He married another woman, but he and the
plaintiff cohabited together for almost thirty years. After the
'Deegan's Coal Co. v. Hedrick, 91 W. Va. 377, 113 S. E. 262 (1922);
Sutherland v. Guthrie, 86 W. Va. 208, 103 S. E. 298 (1920) ; Brooks v. Martin,
2 Wall. 70, 17 L. ed. 732 (1863).
'Newcomb v. Brooks, 16 W. Va. 58 (1879).
Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494, 25 L. ed. 1065 (1879) ; Ridge v. Healey,
251 Fed. 798 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
OMcConkey v. Cockey, 69 Md. 286, 14 Atl. 465 (1888).
'Stahl v. Stahl, 115 Neb. 882, 215 N. W. 131 (1927).
'Rogers v. Brightman, 189 Ala. 228, 66 So. 71 (1914); O'Neil v. Mor-
rison, 233 N. W. 708 (Ia., 1930); Bogie v. Nolan, 96 Mo. 85, 9 S. W. 14
(1888); Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 (1882).
' Laing v. Crichton, 110 W. Va. 3, 156 S. E. 746 (1931) ; Young v. Columbia
Oil Co., 158 S. E. 678 (W. Va., 1931). See comments on these cases (1931)
37 W. VA. L. Q. 449 and (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 158.
"164 S. E. 777 (W. Va., 1931). Rehearings denied Apr. 25 and June
11, 1932.
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death of his second wife, Mr. Williamson decided that he and
the plaintiff should make some change in their mode of living.
They came to some sort of oral agreement on October 1, 1916, to
the effect that neither was to interfere with the property of the
other. Later, Mr. Williamson had the antenuptial contract, which
was the subject of this suit, prepared by an attorney. The plain-
tiff signed it on the evening of January 2, 1917. She and Mr.
Williamson were married the next morning. The court found
that the antenuptial contract was merely a preliminary to the
engagement and held that the parties were dealing at arm's
length until the engagement was actually consummated. This
decision was rendered December 8, 1931.
On April 12, 1932, the decision in Summers v. Ort' was
handed down. In that case an injunction was sought to restrain
the sale of certain property under a trust deed which a mother
had given as surety for her son, Eugene R. Summers, in a business
undertaking. Defendant, Ort, who owned a chain of grocery
stores, had employed Eugene R. Summers as general manager of
one store. By the contract, Summers was to reimburse Ort for
any losses that the business might sustain. Apparently Ort's
agent represented to Summers that the store had been a paying
proposition in the past, when, in fact, the last two managers had
lost money on it. There was a loss of over six thousand dollars,
and Ort undertook to sell the mother's property under the trust
deed. The sale was perpetually enjoined, the court holding that
the contract between Ort and Summers was void because the
parties stood in a confidential relation toward each other at the
time it was negotiated, and Ort had not made full disclosure of
all the material facts connected with the undertaking. The court
said the confidential relation arose at the beginning of the nego-
tiations leading up to the contract.
Thirteen days later, the court refused a rehearing in the
Wiliamson case. It seems that the wrong result was reached in
both eases.
The facts in the Williamson case scarcely appear to sustain
the finding that the parties were not engaged to be married be-
fore the antenuptial contract was made. The only contract that
would have been recognized under the Statute of Frauds" was
- 163 S. E. 854 (W. Va., 1932).
"W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1916) c. 98, § 1; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 55,
art. 1, § 1.
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the one executed on the eve of the marriage. The whole situa-
tion indicates that the parties were engaged; at least, from the
date of the October agreement. That point is really not denied,
but a majority of the court thought the antenuptial contract
originated at that time also. It is difficult, however, to see that
the vague, general understanding reached in October was the
same as the very explicit and- detailed contract signed on
the eve of the marriage. But even if the antenuptial contract
did have its inception in the October agreement, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the parties were dealing at arm's length when it
was negotiated."
The majority of the court rested its decision largely on the
Illinois case of Martin v. Collison,1 ' which did hold that until the
parties became engaged, they dealt with each other at arm's
length. But as Judge Hatcher pointed out in his dissent, the
facts in Martin v. Collison differed materially from those in the
Williamson case, in that the relations of the parties there had
been merely casual until the date of the agreement. Apparently,
however, no importance is generally given to this view of the
Illinois court. That the parties were on the verge of marriage
at the time of making the contract and later did marry are the
facts that interest most courts rather than whether the engage-
ment followed or preceded the contract.' In Pierce v. Pierce,"
the New York Court of Appeals said, "The relation of parties
who are about to enter into the married state is one of mutual
confidence, and far different from that of those who are dealing
with each other at arm's length." No mention was made of the
necessity for an antecedent engagement. This seems to be the
"Estate of Harris Gosbach, Deceased, 96 Pa. Supr. Ct. 527 (1929). "A
prospective husband and wife, when executing an antenuptial agreement,
stand in a confidential relation one to another and the utmost good faith is
required."
1266 ]1l. 172, 107 N.- E. 257 (1914). The contract began with "Whereas
the parties are about to enter into a contract of marriage ...". The court
said this language indicated that there was not an existing engagement. In
DeBolt v. Blackburn, 328 Ill. 420, 159 N. E. 790 (1927), the contract started
with "Whereas it is the intention of the parties hereto to enter into a mar-
riage contract... ". The court held that this language indicated an antece-
dent engagement, distinguishing it from the prior case on the difference
between the words about and intention. Such a distinction is very artificial,
for if one is about to marry, he certainly has some intentions concerning the
matter. It seems that the court just seized on this slight difference to get
away from the bad holding of Martin v. Collison.
1Dehart v. Dehart, 154 S. E. 870 (W. Va., 1930) ; Potter's Ex'r. v. Potter,
234 Ky. 769, 29 S. W. (2d) 35 (1930); In re Enyart's Estate, 100 Neb.
337, 160 N. W. 120 (1916).
I' 71 N. Y. 154, 27 Am. Rep. 22 (1877).
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proper approach, for, as already indicated, a fiduciary relation-
ship may arise from any association through which the parties
have come to place special confidence and trust in each other, a
contractual relationship not being always necessary.
It was apparently assumed that an antecedent engagement
was the only possible basis upon which to predicate a fiduciary
obligation on the part of Mr. Williamson to deal fairly by the
plaintiff. No significance seems to have been given to the fact
that he had dominated thirty years of the best part of her life;
that she had, through years of habit, come to rely upon his judg-
ment and advice; that he was a shrewd and experienced business
man, surrounded by friends and skilled counsel; while she was an
illiterate woman with no disinterested adviser. In an ordinary
business transaction, unconnected with the question of marriage,
Mr. Williamson would not have been permitted to take advantage
of her thus to his own profit ;" fortiori, he should not have been
permitted to take advantage of her in an antenuptial contract.
It appears that a confidential or fiduciary relation existed
between the parties here at the time of making the contract from
any of three possible views: (1) at the time an obligation in
binding form was entered into the parties were pretty clearly
betrothed; (2) parties entering into an antenuptial contract are
normally in a fiduciary relation to each other regardless of
whether the engagement precedes or follows the contract; (3) the
long and intimate relations of the parties here would have put
Mr. Williamson under a fiduciary obligation in dealing with the
plaintiff even in ordinary business transactions.
In the Summers case, the opposite extreme was reached. Two
men negotiated a contract which proved unprofitable for one of
them. The loser escaped the consequences of his bad bargain on
the ground that a fiduciary obligation had be~n violated by the
other party. It was assumed that the contract created an agency
which would, of course, entail a confidential relationship. But
that is not decisive of the question as to whether or not one
stranger was justified in reposing confidence and trust in another
as soon as they met and before any contract of agency was execut-
e& Such confidence would be hard to justify. The relation of
attorney and client is one that places a very high fiduciary
obligation on the attorney, but it has been repeatedly held that
"Leighton v. Orr, 44 Ia. 679 (1876); Maclean v. Hart, 141 Misec. Rep.
222, 252 N. Y. Supp. 377 (1931).
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the parties deal at arm's length until the contract of employment
is actually consummated.' It seems that should have been the
result in Summers v. Ort. There had been no prior relations be-
tween the parties, and no reason appeared why one should have
reposed unusual confidence and trust in the other before the
negotiations were completed. They were ordinary strangers en-
tering into a business transaction; and, as such, there seems to be
small reason for saying that they dealt other than at arm's
length.
It is worthy of note that in the Summers case the principal
was held to the high fiduciary responsibility. That is the converse
of the normal case, for, ordinarily, the agent is the dominant
party."' The principal necessarily reposes great confidence and
trust in the agent when he puts the agent in charge of his busi-
ness, but the major trust that the agent puts in the principal is
that the principal will pay him for his services. No notice was
taken of this point in deciding the case.
It is apparent, therefore, that the fiduciary or confidential
relation idea is primarily important in helping to determine the
proper ethical standard for a given transaction. The two cases
just discussed involve different situations. The Wffliamson case
is concerned with the ethical standard for domestic relations,
while the Summers case deals with ordinary business ethics. From
the very nature of things the ethical plane of domestic relations
is necessarily higher than that required in business. Confidence
and trust are the very foundation upon which the whole structure
of domestic relations is builded. As to business affairs, high
ethical standards are much to be desired; but business men are
wont to investigate for themselves and rely on their own judg-
ment rather than trust blindly to the good faith of the party with
whom they are dealing. The standard set up in Summers v.
Ort is artificial and does not accord with present day business
practices and ideas. Its desirability as a business standard is
2 Cooley v. Miller, 156 Cal. 510, 105 Pae. 981 (1909); Miller v. Loyd, 181
Ill. App. 230 (1913); State v. American Bonding and Casualty Co., 237 N.
W. 360 (Ia., 1931); Coughlon v. Pedelty, 233 N. W. 63 (Ia., 1930); Elder v.
Frazier, 174 Ia. 46, 156 N. W. 182 (1916); Title Guarantee Co. v. Stem-
berg, 119 App. Div. 28, 103 N. Y. Supp. 857 (1907) ; Boyd v. Daily, 85 App.
Div. 581, 83 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1903); Dockery v. McLellan, 93 Wis. 381, 67
N. W. 733 (1896); 2 MCHEm ON AGENCY (2d ed.) § 2294. For an inference to
the same effect, see Dorr v. Camden, 55 W. Va. 226,.46 S. E. 1014 (1904).
"Sperry v. Sperry, 80 W. Va. 142, 92 S. E. 574 (1917).
2 Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. St. 120 (1868). " There is perhaps no relation in
life in which more unbounded confidence is reposed than in that existing
between parties who are betrothed to each other."
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probably open to serious question; but be that as it may, the fact
remains that it is not justified by the present state of our law.
Doubtless business standards can be elevated by judicial deci-
sions, but the process of elevation must be well considered, grad-
ual, and not too far in advance of ordinary business customs.
On the other hand, it is scarcely necessary to suggest that the
Williamson case falls far short of the orthodox ethical standard
for domestic relations. Consequently, the West Virginia law oil
the subject of fiduciary or confidential relations is in a decidedly
unsatisfactory state.
-GEORGE W. McQU(AN.
PuRcHAsE MoNEY RESULTING TRUSTS IN WEST VIRGINIA. -
Purchase money resulting trusts have been a very fertile field of
litigation in West Virginia. Due to the very considerable num-
ber of cases decided, the West Virginia decisions mark out for
this jurisdiction the applicability of most of the rules developed
in this branch of the law. The decisions are for the most part in
conformity with the weight of American authority. The circum-
stances under which this doctrine has been invoked and applied
may be roughly divided into two classes; first, situations wherein
the purchaser and grantee are strangers, and secondly, wherein
they are related by blood or marriage.
Where, upon a purchase of property, the conveyance of the
legal title is taken in the name of one person, while the considera-
tion is given or paid by another, the parties being strangers to
each other, a resulting trust arises by virtue of the transaction.1
The party who pays the consideration becomes in law a cestui
que trust while the party receiving legal title is trustee. This
rule is founded on the natural presumption that the person who
furnishes the purchase money intends the purchase to be for his
own benefit. This presumption is rebuttable by the grantee.
The evidence must be clear and unequivocal.' Mere admission
made by the party holding legal title that he holds the property
'Pumphrey v. Brown, 5 W. Va. 107 (1872); Despard v. Despard, 53 W.
Va. 443, 44 S. E. 448 (1903) ; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541 (1878).
2Pumphrey v. Brown, supra n. 1.
Logan, Walton, Adm'rs. v. Pritt, 93 W. Va. 375, 116 S. E. 759 (1923).
4 Cassaday v. Cassaday, 74 W. Va. 53, 81 S. E. 829 (1914).
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